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ABSTRACT: This article explores the creative value of the notion of
‘repetition’ in Michel Foucault’s texts from the 1960s and early
1970s. Re-enactingGillesDeleuze’s philosophy, Foucault implicitly
refers to the Freudian repetitionmechanisms in order to distort and
reverse them. Foucault’s repetition is de-psychologized, affectively
de-individualizing, and temporally erratic, using the power of a
senseless repetition to create new possibilities for the future.
The ICI Berlin Repository is amulti-disciplinary open access archive for the dissemination of scientific research documents related to the ICI Berlin, whether
they are originally published by ICI Berlin or elsewhere. Unless noted otherwise, the documents are made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-
ShareAlike 4.o International License, which means that you are free to share and adapt the material, provided you give appropriate credit, indicate any
changes, and distribute under the same license. See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ for further details. In particular, you should indicate
all the information contained in the cite-as section above.
Repetition
Differential Monotony, Affects, Creation
ARIANNA SFORZINI
The notion of repetition has been variously analysed in
twentieth-century philosophy as a means to question the
concepts of representation and mimesis together with
the traditional ideas of the subject and object of know-
ledge.Michel Foucault, GillesDeleuze, JacquesDerrida—
amongothers—are themain philosopherswho conceived
of a new relation between history, subjectivity, and real-
ity in which ‘repetition’ and its ‘difference’ are at stake.
The Foucauldian reactivation of the Deleuzean concept
of repetition as ‘difference without a concept’ is particu-
larly interesting as it allows to approach this contemporary
debate about the gesture of repeating — reaffirming a
doublewhich is never a simple copy of an original element.
In order to describe this philosophical use of the notion
of repetition, however, it is important to recall another
central twentieth-century conceptualization of the repe-
tition mechanisms that could be usefully described as an
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‘other repetition’ in relation to which Foucault (the most
Deleuzean Foucault) elaborates his thought: the Freudian
repetition according to Freud’s fundamental 1920 Beyond
the Pleasure Principle.1
In this text, Freud questions his own theory insofar as
it took the pursuit of pleasure as the only force regulating
the behaviour of living organisms. Anyone would instinct-
ively look for pleasure and avoid pain. Yet the observation
of various patients showing strange compulsive behaviours
convinced Freud that there must be something ‘beyond’
the simple principle of pleasure. Individuals often engage
in repetitions of gestures or thoughts that are clearly pain-
ful, far from being a source of gratification. How is it even
possible to fixate on a traumatic experience? Shouldn’t the
mind stick to pleasant memories and forget hurtful ones,
as far as it can? Beyond the Pleasure Principle is largely in-
fluenced by the spread of post-traumatic disorders, which
were a painful reality in 1920 Europe, in the immediate
aftermath of the World War I. These traumatic neuroses
were believed to derive from physical injuries the soldiers
sustained during the war. But Freud proposed another the-
ory. He observed that the post-traumatic symptoms were
common even among people who hadn’t been physically
wounded, indeed even among the civilian population, des-
pite the fact that they hadn’t witnessed the war first hand.
Some patients seemed ‘traumatized’ by their own fantasies
and desires.
What strikes Freud in post-traumatic neuroses is pre-
cisely these patients’ compulsion to repeat traumatic ex-
1 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle [1920], in The Stand-
ard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed.
and trans. by James Strachey, 24 vols (London: Hogarth, 1953–74),
xviii: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Group Psychology andOtherWorks
(1920–22) (1955), pp. 1–64.
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periences, for example, by dreaming of them. Why should
the unconscious mind re-propose images and feelings that
have been traumatic for the individual? Freud himself had
previously considered dreams as the symbolic expression
of unconscious desires— for instance in his seminal 1900
work on the interpretation of dreams.2 He thought the
unconscious mind uses dreams to fulfil its own desires
even if they go against social constraints.Nightmares, how-
ever, are difficult to explain with this analytical pattern.
After traumatic experiences, bad dreams tend to activate
the trauma itself indefinitely, despite the individual’s con-
scious efforts to drive the mind away from it.
Oddly enough, Freud finds a possible answer to this
repetition compulsion by analysing a children’s game. He
famously termed it the ‘Fort-Da’ experience: he observes
his 18-months-old grandson, Ernst, repeatedly throwing
away a toy and picking it up again, while repeating the ex-
pression ‘fort-da’ (‘gone’ and ‘there’). Freud affirms that
the child’s behaviour is not guidedby theprinciple of pleas-
ure—byany kindof immediate self-satisfaction.Thepoint
of the Fort-Da is the repetition itself, or more precisely, the
compulsion of repeating a particular traumatic experience:
the mother leaving the child, the child’s realization of the
necessity of being separated from the mother. The repe-
tition is a means of mastering a trauma in an active and
creative way: the child is attempting to deal with a situ-
ation it couldn’t foresee and which is definitely out of its
control. More generally, following Freud, any trauma then
presents itself as a feeling the individual couldn’t anticipate
nor expect— for example through anxiety— and that she
is obliged to master through its repetition, even if this re-
2 Sigmund Freud,The Interpretation of Dreams [1900], inThe Standard
Edition, iv–v (1953).
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peating action is a source of displeasure. Repetition is the
compulsive return of a past the individual couldn’t anti-
cipate. It embodies a non-linear temporality the individual
mind has to reproduce in order to master an affective and
potentially disruptive energy. The repetition is a sort of
‘techniqueof the self ’more or less effective tomakeoneself
survive one’s own traumatic past.
The Foucauldian notion of repetition, re-enacting
Deleuze’s philosophy, implicitly refers to the Freudian
one, but does so in order to distort and reverse it. The
repetition put into play by Foucault has three main
characteristics: (1) It is de-psychologized, acting on the
level of discourse and not in the depth of the human
mind; (2) It is affectively de-individualizing, dissolving
the individual subject into a complex and heterogeneous
web of anonymous relations; (3) It is temporally erratic,
using the power of a senseless repetition not to provide
a meaning to a traumatic past experience but to create a
new space of future possibility. The repetition is not the
reactivation of the same, from past to present, but the
interruptive monotony of the different, from present to
future.
‘Repetition’ is explicitlymentionedbyFoucault in two
texts he wrote on Deleuze’s books Difference and Repeti-
tion and The Logic of Sense: ‘Ariane s’est pendue’ (1969)
and Theatrum philosophicum (1970).3 It reactivates an-
3 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition [1968], trans. by Paul R. Pat-
ton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); The Logic of Sense
[1969], trans. by M. Lester with C. Stivale (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1990). Michel Foucault, ‘Ariane s’est pendue’ [1969],
in Foucault, Dits et écrits, ed. by Daniel Defert, François Ewald, and
Jacques Lagrange, 2 vols (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), i: 1954–1975, text
n° 64, pp. 795–99; ‘Theatrum philosophicum’ [1970], trans. by Donald
F. Brouchard and Sherry Simon, in Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–
1984, ed. by Paul Rabinow, 3 vols (New York: New Press, 1998–2001),
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other very important notion in Foucault’s early works on
discourse published in the 1960s: the double.The double is
a peculiar attribute of discourse and of literature in particu-
lar. Literary language in general is for Foucault at the same
time defective and excessive: defective because words are
rare compared to things and language is irreducible to
the real world; excessive because, in their autonomy from
reality, words can become an instrument of freedom, trans-
forming our attitude towards the world and inventing new
forms of being, unexpected possibilities of thought and
existence.The double is a name for this experience of free-
dom by means of literary language. Literature is a series
of doubles, of ‘doppelgängers’, of mimes of reality whose
role is not to truthfully represent reality itself but tomodify
it through its multiple repetitions, its heterogeneous re-
flections in a distorting mirror. The position of a double
for Foucault is never that of a reproduction of an original
model but the dispersion of the very idea of an ‘origin’ of
sense through the indefinite re-proposition of its copies.
The double is not the same nor the other of the same, but
something new and irreducible in its own difference.
Foucault gives many examples of this literary repe-
tition: the stupidity of Flaubert’s Bouvard and Pécuchet,
Sade and his almost boring descriptions of sex and vio-
lence, the ‘mises en abyme’ of Baroque theatre, the stories
Sheherazade tells to escape death in One Thousand and
One Nights, Raymond Roussel’s jeux de mots, the surreal-
ist poems, and many others. And yet, the most famous
and probably the most intuitive examples of repetition as
the emergence of difference are pictorial ones: Magritte’s
ii: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, ed. by James D. Faubion
(1998), pp. 343–68.
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works (in his renowned text ‘This Is Not a Pipe’)4 and
Andy Warhol pop series. To take the example of his ac-
count ofWarhol’sCampbell’s SoupCans, produced in 1962:
the same soup can is repeated 32 times, and it is precisely
this apparently senseless repetition that allows for differ-
ence to arise as the minimal and yet fundamental fracture
in the uniform space of meanings and values:
This is the greatness of Warhol with his canned
foods, senseless accidents, and his series of advert-
ising smiles: the oral and nutritional equivalence of
those half-open lips, teeth, tomato sauce, that hy-
giene based on detergents; the equivalence of death
in the cavity of an eviscerated car, at the topof a tele-
phone pole and at the end of a wire, and between
the glistening, steel blue arms of the electric chair.
‘It’s the same either way,’ stupidity says, while sink-
ing into itself and infinitely extending its nature
with the things it says of itself; ‘Here or there, it’s al-
ways the same thing; what difference if the colours
vary, if they’re darker or lighter. It’s all so senseless
— life, women, death! How stupid this stupidity!’
But, in concentrating on this boundless monotony,
we find the sudden illumination of multiplicity it-
self—withnothing at its centre, at its highest point,
or beyond it— a flickering of light that travels even
faster than the eyes and successively lights up the
moving labels and the captive snapshots that refer
to each other to eternity, without ever saying any-
thing: suddenly, arising from the background of the
old inertia of equivalences, the zebra stripe of the
event tears through the darkness, and the eternal
phantasm informs that soup can, that singular and
depthless face.5
4 Michel Foucault, This Is Not a Pipe [1968], trans. by J. Harkness
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).
5 Foucault, ‘Theatrum philosophicum’, p. 362.
ARIANNA SFORZINI 105
In an unpublished text on Andy Warhol’sMarilyn Diptych
(1962), Foucault affirms that the series of Marilyns are a
sort of deformeddoppelgänger of the classical ‘tableau’, the
diptych of the title and its series: the series of images are
not ‘serialized’ in order to classify, master, hierarchize, and
unify them.6 Rather, the ‘series of series’ composed by the
repetition ofMarilyn’s smile, is a ‘difference of differences’:
a ‘savage multiplicity’, the repetition of difference, the dif-
ference of repetition.
There is, then, a ‘repetition compulsion’ in the Fou-
cauldian philosophical practice. But it does not correspond
to the psychological need to master a traumatic past in
order to build a meaningful individual subjectivity. It is,
on the contrary, the power of breaking the uniform sets
of values that shape our present and the present forms
of discourse and individualities. It is the immense pos-
sibility of rupture that resides in any minimal difference
repeated through theminute, tiny gestures of art, language,
but also everyday lives.There is always another timewithin
time, another possible world to create, hidden between the
monotony of repetition and its differences.
6 Michel Foucault Archives, Bibliothèque nationale de France, boîte 53,
(NAF 28730).
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